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a b s t r a c t
The DoD annually procures billions of dollars worth of systems, supplies, and services in support of the
national military strategy. Faced with budget cuts and other resource constraints, the DoD must
transform its procurement process to ensure cost-effective sourcing of critical supplies and services.
One aspect of current transformation in the DoD is the use of a strategic sourcing approach for the
procurement of services at military installations. Using the Air Force’s strategic sourcing process as our
context, we developed an optimization model for selecting a set of proposals from among multiple
offerors for services to be performed at multiple installations. The selection achieves the most favorable
objective by balancing the confidence level in an offeror’s past performance with the cost of services to
the Air Force. The research findings, which are based on a realistic scenario, demonstrate improvements
over the current sourcing process in both overall performance and cost.
Published by Elsevier Ltd.
1. Introduction
Government agencies today are operating in an environment
characterized by countless economic and political disruptions to
their sources of supplies and services (S&S). In order to survive in
this turbulent marketplace, these agencies must continually
monitor both their competitive position and their internally
controllable processes—especially the contract management pro-
cess. The Department of Defense (DoD) is no exception. It
annually procures billions of dollars worth of systems, supplies,
and services in support of the national military strategy. In Fiscal
Year 2009, contract obligations for the DoD included $370 billion
for defense-related supplies and services (FPDS, 2010). Faced with
fiscal battles of budget cuts and resource constraints, the DoD
must transform its procurement process to ensure a cost-effective
sourcing of S&S. The procurement process at the DoD will
continue to increase in importance as the DoD acquires mis-
sion-critical and complex S&S.
In addition, the DoD has been undergoing a transformation
from a transaction-oriented perspective to a strategic-oriented
enterprise. No longer viewed as a tactical, clerical, or adminis-
trative function, the procurement function is gaining enhanced
status and importance. This transformation can be attributed to
the fact that leading organizations, including the DoD, have begun
to understand and realize the importance of procurement in
helping an organization achieve its strategic objectives as well
as the impact of procurement on competitive advantage. Further-
more, organizations are including procurement objectives in the
development of corporate strategy and have placed increased
emphasis on developing corporate procurement strategies. One
aspect of this transformation in DoD is the acquisition of services
at the location where the service is delivered, that is, at each
military installation. The U.S. Air Force is geographically orga-
nized in regions that are comprised of installations. Our research
studies the use of a strategic sourcing approach for the procure-
ment of services for each of the installations. Examples of
installation-level services include custodial, grounds mainte-
nance, housing maintenance, and refuse collection. The Air Force
has taken the lead in adopting a strategic sourcing approach for
the procurement of its major S&S (Rendon, 2005; USAF, 2009).
Using the Air Force’s strategic sourcing process as our context,
we discuss the development and application of quantitative
strategic sourcing. Our approach uses a mathematical model for
evaluating and selecting an optimal set of offeror’s proposals.
Quantitative strategic sourcing using optimization has been used
in the private sector (Akinc, 1993; Cochran and Uribe, 2005;
Current and Weber, 1994; Gupta and Krishnan, 1999; Lang et al.,
2008; Nepal et al., 2009). However, most of the existing research
in this topic is for products with a focus on cost. We study
services acquisition in the public sector with focus on cost as well
as confidence in the performance level of the service provider
given by their historical performance.
The objective of the research is to show how a pricing
optimization (PO) model can be successfully used in optimal
bidding approaches, in which multiple offerors submit bids for
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both individual and multiple installation locations. Specifically,
this research employs a set covering problem to find a set of
proposals that will achieve the most favorable objective. A
manager may set the objective based on both the confidence
level of an offeror’s past performance and the cost of the service
to the Air Force.
The remainder of this article begins with a literature review of
the relevant topics to identify the gaps in the research articles
published so far which establish the backdrop for our contribu-
tion. We then discuss how the Air Force is adopting strategic
sourcing in its Installation Acquisition Transformation (IAT)
initiative. Following this, we discuss our approach to strategic
source selection. We then describe implementation of the model
and results. We conclude by discussing our contribution, sum-
marizing our study, and suggesting possible extensions to other
DoD ( Army and Navy) strategic source selections.
2. Literature review
In this exploratory research, we develop a quantitative model
for the strategic sourcing initiative for services acquisition in the
Air Force. Therefore, our literature review focuses on strategic
purchasing, public procurement and quantitative strategic sour-
cing models.
2.1. Strategic purchasing and public procurement
The transformation of the purchasing function from a passive,
administrative, and reactive process to a proactive, strategic,
boundary-spanning function reflects a new integrated approach
to purchasing that embraces the other supply chain management
functions of materials management, logistics, and physical dis-
tribution. This integrated approach to purchasing and supply
management plays a strategic role within the organization by
contributing to the bottom line, serving as an information source,
increasing efficiency and productivity, enhancing the continuous
improvement process, and improving competitive position and
customer satisfaction (Benton, 2010).
The strategic purchasing focus requires organizations to adopt
a strategic orientation to their procurement function and to look
more at the total supply chain management process and its effect
on the organization’s competitive strategy. More specifically, it
involves linking the organization’s procurement or sourcing
strategy with its corporate competitive strategy. This requires
supply managers to become active participants in developing
their organization’s strategic business plan, which now includes
the integration of supply, marketing, finance, and conversion
strategies. Other major developments in the transformation to
strategic purchasing include the breaking down of functional
walls with the use of cross-functional teams, the develop-
ment and management of supply chains and supply alliances,
the use of electronic procurement systems, and the adoption of
strategic sourcing approaches (Burt et al., 2010). Strategic pur-
chasing strategies have been successfully implemented by IBM
(Carbone, 1999; Reed et al., 2005), Deere & Co. (Smock, 2001),
Lucent Technologies (Carbone, 2002), Cessna Aircraft Co. (Avery,
2003), and Hewlett-Packard (Carbone, 2004). Each of these world-
class purchasing organizations has successfully implemented
strategic purchasing initiatives and has reaped the benefits of
transforming its purchasing function to a strategically integrated
supply management process.
Strategic purchasing has been explored in the context of cross-
culture, organizational relationship, supplier development, and
supplier relationship. Strategic purchasing has been studied in a
cross-cultural context by Ogden et al. (2007) in which differences in
three factors associated with strategic sourcing—professionalism,
status, and techniques between North American and European
countries are analyzed. Their research determines that general
differences exist between countries in terms of purchasing profes-
sionalism and status, but not in terms of the degree to which supply
management techniques are practiced.
Cousins and Spekman (2003) identify some of the barriers,
internal to the organizations as well as throughout its supply
chain, to implementing strategic purchasing and supply manage-
ment. Their research also identifies two relationship clusters
throughout the supply chain—opportunistic relationships, which
are focused on short-term price reductions, and collaborative
relationships, which are focused on long-term cost reductions.
Additionally, the effect of supplier development practices on the
supplier’s product and delivery performance, the firm’s buyer–
supplier relationship, and the customer firm’s competitive
advantage is analyzed by Wagner (2006). He identifies a positive
relationship between customer firm’s indirect supplier develop-
ment activities and the supplier firm’s product and delivery
performance and supplier relationship improvement. Wagner
(2006) also identifies a positive relationship between supplier
relationship improvement and the customer firms’ attainment of
a cost leadership strategy and a differentiation strategy.
Just as the commercial sector has experienced success in
transforming to strategic purchasing, the United States public
sector, specifically the federal government and the DoD, has put
into place strategic purchasing initiatives to improve its purchas-
ing processes (Husted and Reinecke, 2009). Many of these
transformation initiatives previously implemented by commercial
companies are recommended by the United States Government
Accountability Office (GAO) for the DoD. Reports by the GAO
recommend that the transformation to strategic purchasing taken
by the leading companies can serve as a general framework to
guide the DoD’s contracting initiatives (GAO, 2002, 2003a, b).
Although strategic purchasing in public procurement is still
relatively new, current research in public procurement has
focused on areas such as promoting competitive markets, inno-
vative practices using private partnerships, demand-oriented
policy, and the establishment of public sector purchasing as an
academic discipline. Caldwell et al. (2005) research how public
procurement agencies address establishing and maintaining com-
petitive markets. Based on three case studies, they identify the
following: in order to maintain competitive markets suppliers
should be incentivized to meet broader public sector require-
ments; public agencies should look beyond choosing the best
supplier and instead focus on managing suppliers within a
portfolio of market relationships; and that the skills of public
procurement officials need to evolve to reflect strategic post-
award contracting issues. Lawther and Martin (2005) identify
major trends promoting public procurement partnerships
(government procurement workforce crisis, changing role of the
public procurement officer, contracting for IT, competitive con-
tract negotiations, risk management, use of long-term contracts).
They use two case studies to demonstrate how the public, private,
and non-profit sectors can work together in public procurement
partnerships. Edler and Georghiou (2007) discuss public procure-
ment as a key element of a demand-oriented innovation policy
and a potential instrument for mobilizing innovation, public
policy goals, and delivering better services. Rendon and Snider’s
(2010) comparison of supply management within the fields of
business administration and public administration indicates that
supply management is more developed in the business adminis-
tration field than in the public administration field. They identify
various reasons for this uneven academic development in the two
fields, to include supply management identity issues in public
administration, structural differences between private and public
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entities, and differences between the ‘‘bottom-line’’ in business
administration and the ‘‘public interest’’ in public administration
(Rendon and Snider, 2010, p. 104).
2.2. Quantitative strategic sourcing models
‘‘Outsourcing takes place when an organization transfers the
ownership of traditional functions and value-added activities to a
vendor’’ (Sucky, 2007, p. 3638). The DoD is one such organization
which routinely outsources services. Therefore studying best
practices in strategic sourcing is a necessary element in services
acquisition.
Methodologies using quantitative modeling for strategic sour-
cing can be found in the supply chain management literature.
In order to select a vendor, Sucky (2007) proposes a dynamic
decision model. The author formulates a mixed-integer program-
ming model to minimize all the costs. The dynamic process
incorporates interdependencies in time due to investment costs
of choosing and/or switching to a new vendor. Supplier switching
decisions are discussed by Wagner and Friedl (2007). Here, the
authors analyze asymmetry of information using principal-agent
framework.
The evaluation process can include an objective framework
such as principle-agent theory or dynamic decision models as
opposed to qualitative approaches (Talluri and Narasimhan,
2004). These authors consider multiple strategic and operational
factors by categorizing the suppliers in groups based on perfor-
mance. Their emphasis is on strategic supplier development
initiatives. They claim that their method is more robust than
the existing Data Envelopment Analysis in vendor selection
literature.
Degraeve et al. (2000) use total cost of ownership as a basis for
comparing supplier selection models in strategic sourcing. One of
the methodologies is mathematical programming models (Akinc,
1993; Chaudhry et al., 1993; Current and Weber, 1994; Pan, 1989;
Rosenthal et al., 1995; Sadrian and Yoon, 1994; Turner, 1988;
Weber and Current, 1993; Weber and Deasai, 1996). Most of these
models use either single item or multiple item scenarios with or
without inventory management over time. They consider product
suppliers and determine vendors (i.e., suppliers or offerors) as
well as order quantities for the product.
Given the current literature of strategic purchasing, there
seems to be a lack of research in the area of strategic sourcing,
specifically within the area of services contracting in the public
procurement sector. In terms of research in quantitative strategic
sourcing models, most of the research studies are product-
oriented with focus on various costs such as switching costs,
price to the buyer, or total ownership costs. We, on the other
hand, focus on services as opposed to product. Suppliers of
services face unique challenges because services are intangible
in measurement of quality and are difficult to store. Due to this
aspect we also use past performance of the service provider as
one of the factors for our objective. This treatment is found in the
work by Talluri and Narasimhan (2004). They also categorize the
suppliers based on performance. Our research is developed,
similar to Wagner and Friedl (2007), based on economies of scale.
However, we use an integer programming model to find our
answers as opposed to principal-agent theory or dynamic
decision model.
3. Strategic purchasing in the US Air Force
The strategic purchasing process in the private sector is very
similar to the process used in the public sector. However, within
the public sector, specifically the DoD, other public policy goals
such as, competition, small-business participation, transparency
and accountability are of increased importance.
One example of strategic purchasing in the DoD is the U.S. Air
Force Installation Acquisition Transformation (IAT) program. The
IAT was approved by the Secretary of the Air Force in August 2007
to transform contracting operations at all Air Force installations in
the continental United States (USAF, 2009). The Air Force business
case analysis identified the $15 billion annual spend as a prime
target for strategic sourcing. Benefits from the IAT strategic
sourcing include reduction of total cost of ownership, manage-
ment of consumption, improved operating efficiency, and
improved focus on socio-economic goals (USAF, 2009).
3.1. Contract management process
The Air Force strategic sourcing model can be described using
the basic DoD contract management process (Rendon and Snider,
2008). The contracting pre-award phases include planning the
procurement (conducting stakeholder, requirement and market
analysis, selecting the procurement method, and determining the
contract type), developing the solicitation document (such as
request for proposal), issuing the solicitation document (using an
internet-based portal), and then receiving offeror bids. Once the
bids are received, the source selection process involves evaluating
the bids (cost and technical), conducting negotiations with the
offerors, and awarding the contract to the selected offeror. This
source selection process is the key phase in our research study.
Our efforts are focused on making this step of the contract
management process more efficient. After contract award, the
contract administration phase involves monitoring the contrac-
tor’s performance, processing contractor requests for payments,
and managing changes to the contract. The final contract manage-
ment phase is contract closeout, which involves completing and
settling the contract (including resolving any open items), making
final payment, and documenting contractor performance infor-
mation. Using the contract management process described above,
we will now discuss some specific elements of strategic sourcing,
which forms the basis for our research.
3.2. Proposal evaluation strategy
During the source selection phase of the contract management
process, the offerors’ submitted bids are evaluated in accordance
with the basis for evaluation stated in the solicitation. In defense
procurement, multiple criteria are often used in proposal evalua-
tion and supplier selection. The evaluation of offerors’ proposals
for determining contract award includes mandatory evaluation
factors such as cost, quality, past performance, and sometimes,
subcontracting to small or minority businesses. In addition to the
mandatory evaluation factors discussed above, the procuring
agency may also include evaluation factors unique to the specific
procurement. For example, in aircraft development procurement,
fuel efficiency or the use of alternate fuel sources could be an
important evaluation factor. The procuring agency has flexibility
in determining the relative importance of these evaluation
factors. Some evaluation factors may be assigned higher importance
and used in a tradeoff process in the source selection decision.
The complexity of the source selection process will depend on
the bid evaluation strategy selected. In some contract source
selections, in which the requirement (supply or service being
procured) is clearly definable and the risk of unsuccessful contract
performance is minimal, cost or price may play a dominant role in
the award decision. In these procurements, the government uses
the lowest-priced, technically acceptable bid evaluation strategy.
In other source selections, in which the requirement is less
definitive and more development work is required (resulting in
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greater performance risk), technical, quality, or past performance
considerations may play a dominant role. In these procurements,
the government uses a trade-off process (permitting trade-offs
among cost and non-cost factors) to award to an offeror anywhere
on the best value continuum between the lowest-priced techni-
cally acceptable offeror and the highest technically rated offeror.
Strategic purchasing source selections typically use the trade-
off proposal evaluation strategy. An often used bid evaluation
strategy for installation-level services is the Performance Price
Trade-off (PPT) strategy. The PPT process is a source selection
strategy that permits a trade-off between price and an offeror’s
past performance in reaching the award decision. Past perfor-
mance information reveals how well the offeror performed work
relevant to the type of effort and type of requirement described in
the solicitation and confirms the recency of the performance. In a
PPT source selection, the contract can be awarded to an offeror
with a higher past performance rating over a lower performance-
rated offeror if the price differential is warranted and considered
to be best value. A common PPT approach is to first evaluate the
offeror’s technical bid on an acceptable/unacceptable basis. Next,
the technically acceptable offerors are evaluated for price reason-
ableness and ranked by total evaluated price. Finally, the offeror’s
recent and relevant past performance is evaluated resulting
in a performance confidence assessment rating. This evaluation
process will result in an overall performance confidence assess-
ment of Substantial Confidence, Satisfactory Confidence, Limited
Confidence, No Confidence, or Unknown Confidence.
If the past performance of the lowest-priced, technically
acceptable offeror is rated as Substantial Confidence (the highest
performance rating), then that bid would be considered the best
value to the government and would be awarded the contract. If
the past performance of the lowest-priced, technically acceptable
offeror is not rated as Substantial Confidence, then the next lowest-
priced, technically acceptable offeror is assessed until an offeror is
identified that is rated Substantial Confidence or until all offerors
are evaluated. In the award to a higher priced offeror with a better
performance confidence assessment rating, the government must
decide whether the past performance advantage of that offeror is
worth the difference in price. This decision involves a best value
integrated assessment documenting the merits of the tradeoffs
between price and performance.
The DoD procurement regulations allow for a tradeoff process
when it may be in the best interest to consider award to other
than the lowest priced offeror or other than the highest techni-
cally rated offeror. This process permits tradeoffs among cost or
price and non-cost factors and allows the DoD to accept other
than the lowest priced proposal. For example, in some source
selections, small business participation may be more important
than cost, or quality. In the aircraft procurement example, the
procuring agency may tradeoff price in favor of fuel efficiency or
the use of alternate fuels in its evaluation of the offerors’
proposals. Thus, the agency may award the contract to a higher-
priced offeror, if the offeror proposes an aircraft that is more fuel
efficient or uses alternate fuel sources.
The Air Force’s strategic sourcing procurements typically
involve a specific commodity of supplies or services—such as
custodial, grounds maintenance, housing maintenance, and refuse
collection—needed at multiple installations across the continen-
tal United States. Because of the level of uncertainty in regard to
the delivery and quantity of the needed services at each installa-
tion, an Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (ID/IQ) contract is
typically used. An ID/IQ contract provides for an indefinite
quantity, within stated limits, of supplies or services during a
fixed period. The government places task or delivery orders for
individual requirements. Quantity limits may be stated as a
number of units or as dollar values. In addition, according to
federal procurement regulations, the contracting officer must give
a preference to making multiple awards of ID/IQ contracts under a
single solicitation for the same or similar supplies or services to
two or more sources. Multiple-award contracts allow the govern-
ment to leverage the advantage of price competition to obtain
optimum prices for DoD.
The proposal evaluation process discussed above is quite
straightforward and noncomplex. However, in source selections
for major strategic sourcing projects, the bid evaluation process
can significantly increase in complexity. This would especially be
the case in the acquisition of services that are to be performed at
multiple installations, evaluating bids for individual as well as
multiple installations, awarding multiple Indefinite Delivery/
Indefinite Quantity contracts, and using a trade-off source selec-
tion strategy such as PPT. These strategic sourcing procurements
present some unique challenges. Fig. 1 describes the approximate
process of evaluating bids to award contracts.
One challenge is identifying the optimum procurement
arrangement given the multiple installations, multiple offerors
with varying performance ratings, and different proposal prices
for each installation, as well as proposals for a combination of
installations. In this complex source selection, the use of math-
ematical modeling will help in identifying the optimum procure-
ment arrangement. The next part of this paper will introduce the
price optimization model and discuss how it can be used in
complex strategic source selections.
4. A pricing optimization approach to strategic source
selection
4.1. Set covering problem
Set covering problem (SCP) is a classic problem in operations
research (e.g., Nemhauser and Wolsey, 1999, pp. 6–7). In SCP,
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Fig. 1. Evaluation process at the Air Force.
A.U. Apte et al. / Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management 17 (2011) 222–230 225
Author's personal copy
a minimum-cost subfamily of S, referred to as a ‘‘cover,’’ CCS,
such that the union of all the sets in C is U. Assuming that each










In this formulation, Eq. (1) minimizes the total cost of the
cover, (2) ensures every element in the original set U is covered by
at least one subset in the cover, and (3) describes that every
subset either is in the cover or not.
Applications of SCPs are abound. In emergency management,
for example, a local government may use SCP to establish the
locations of fire stations so that all communities are covered with
the smallest number of fire stations that result in the lowest fixed
cost. This problem, with an objective function that typically
minimizes the number or cost of facilities required, is also known
as the least-cost, maximal covering problem (Toregas et al., 1971).
A survey of these problems can be found in Brandeau and Chiu
(1989), Church and ReVelle (1974), and Klose and Drexl (2005).
There have been various modifications of this model, as
reviewed extensively by Marianov and ReVelle (1995), for emer-
gency services.
In our study we use SCP for strategic sourcing in order to
assign each installation with a service provider. But, in order to
set the stage for illustrating our model development, we first
describe how SCP has been used in strategic sourcing, in the
existing literature. Nepal et al. (2009) illustrate how SCP can be
used for optimizing sourcing of microcontrollers in an automotive
supplier company. The authors’ case study demonstrates the
economies of scales principle to meet the requirements while
minimizing the cost.
Approaches to product development also use integer-pro-
gramming models where performance of the product itself and
costs are taken into account (Gupta and Krishnan, 1999). This
study provides an insight into strategic sourcing for product
families, especially for integrated components.
Lang et al. (2008, p. 1) focus on services, specifically software
systems using ‘‘service-oriented architecture’’ paradigm. Their
decision incorporates selection of the suppliers and integration
of certain services under various cost scenarios that maximizes
profit. This is an example of a revenue-based model satisfying
functionalities and the demands of a service.
Somewhat similar to our study, Akinc (1993) proposes a bi-
objective approach, seeking to find both the least-cost suppliers
and the fewest suppliers that can deliver all the items. A trade-off
analysis between these two objectives is performed.
Current and Weber (1994) use a facility location model to
formulate the vendor selection problem, minimizing the number
of suppliers. They propose a model based on p-median analysis,
but in the end they also introduce SCP to minimize the number of
suppliers. However, they assume that the cost is not important.
Cochran and Uribe (2005) illustrate the use of SCP in capacity
planning within the supply chain. The objective is to generate
alternative equipment configuration when production dictates use
of expensive multifunctional equipment for changing demand. They
use modified SCP for equipment selection and allocation while
minimizing the cost.
Our research study uses a similar approach to the aforemen-
tioned work by Nepal et al. (2009). However, our case study is in
services acquisition as opposed to product procurement (as is also
the case in most of the studies reviewed here). In addition to
focusing on cost, we also consider the past performance rating
like Gupta and Krishnan (1999). Again, we do that for suppliers as
opposed to the products themselves. Our focus is on modeling
cost to the Air Force, versus revenue (Lang et al., 2008), and
confidence in the performance level of the service provider based
on the past performance, as opposed to number of suppliers
(Akinc, 1993). We use weights so that the managers can calibrate
cost or confidence in performance level as they find fit. Cost is
important in our development of the model unlike the approach
by Current and Weber (1994). Similar to equipment selection and
allocation (Cochran and Uribe, 2005), our SCP model selects
suppliers and allocates them to different customers while mini-
mizing the cost. In order to understand our process we must
explain the methodology.
4.2. The bids
We model the strategic sourcing of bids submitted by techni-
cally acceptable offerors on multiple installations as an SCP, see
Eqs. (1)–(3). In this case, the universal set consists of all the
bids—single as well as multiple contract types, as explained in the
previous sections.
For example, consider two offerors, A and B, bidding for a
certain service to be performed at three installations, 1, 2, and 3.
Table 1 lists all the possible bids by these offerors on all three
installations. For example, Bid #1 is a bid offered by A on
installation 1 alone (single bid), whereas Bid #6 is a bid offered
by A on installation 1 and installation 2 (combined bid), and
Bid #7 offers the same service for all the three installations, 1, 2,
and 3, combined together. There are 14 such possible bids.
However, in reality, all offerors may not bid on all possible bids
due to their own preference or conditions imposed by the Air
Force. The underlying principle is that the more installations
combined in a bid by the offeror, the more the discount (due to
economies of scale or geographic proximity) in price. In other
words, the sum of the individual prices in Bid #1 and #2 (single
bids for installations 1 and 2 individually considered, respec-
tively) is higher than the pricing in Bid #4 (for installations 1 and
2 combined in a single bid). More generally, let b denote a bid for
installations Ib, and let pb be its price. We assume the following
Table 1
List of possible bids.
Offeror Bid # Installation 1 Installation 2 Installation 3 Offeror Bid # Installation 1 Installation 2 Installation 3
A 1 x B 8 x
2 x 9 x
3 x 10 x
4 x x 11 x x
5 x x 12 x x
6 x x 13 x x
7 x x x 14 x x x
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‘‘triangular’’ relationship occurs:
If Ib [ Ib0 ¼ Ib00 , then for any contractor bidding
for Ib,Ib0 , and Ib00 ,pbþpb04pb00 :
(Note that if the above is not true, then we may trivially
eliminate bid b00 from the pool.)
The decision to be made is which bids should be selected in
order to achieve the strategy preset by the authority. The strategy
might be to choose those bids that enjoy the most confidence in
performance level (CPL) without any consideration to the cost, or
the bids that are least expensive with no consideration to CPL.
Common sense dictates that in most cases the strategy will be a
compromise between these two objectives. We account for this by
incorporating a weight as an input to our optimization model. The
objective of the model is to achieve this preset strategy subject to
fundamental constraints that all installations receive the service.
4.3. Notation
I set of installations, for iAI
C set of offerors (contractors), for cAC
B set of bids, for bAB
BiCB subset of bids that contain installation i
BbCB subset of installations in bid b
cbAC offeror for bid b
pb price of bid b [$]
vc performance rating of offeror c [rating] (the lower the
rating, the better the performance)
w penalty weight of performance with respect to cost
[$/performance rating]
hi penalty factor to reflect importance of having a good
performance offeror for installation i [multiplicative factor]
xb binary decision variable: 1 if bid b is selected, and
0 otherwise














In the PO model, Eq. (4) minimizes the cost of the bids and the
measure of CPL, subject to providing service to all installations
(Eq. (5)). In the next section we discuss the implementation of
this model.
The use of a relative weight w in our objective function (4)
implicitly acknowledges a linear tradeoff between price and
performance. A weighed sum of the individual objectives is a
well-known mechanism to deal with the problem of establishing
a compromise between two (possibly conflicting) objectives. In
our case, we fix the weight for price to 1, and let the planner
choose the weight w for performance. Despite these weights must
be empirically established (see next section), the technique has
the advantage that for any set of those weights, the resulting
solution will be ‘‘efficient’’ (also known as Pareto-optimal)
(Ehrgott, 2005, pp. 24, 65–80); that is, from the given solution it
is not possible for one objective to improve without worsening
the other objective.
5. Implementation
We now describe our implementation of the PO model. The
names of the installations and offerors provided by the Air Force
have been altered to maintain confidentiality. This specific
instance of implementation has 18 offerors and 13 installations.
Based on the importance given to cost and confidence in perfor-
mance level (CPL) of the service provider, we assign the weight, w,
in the objective function of the PO model. Each instance with
different weight is a numbered model-scenario.
5.1. Data
The Air Force provided us with raw data on various contracts,
consisting of offerors and their bids on individual installations for
the service of ‘Refuse collection and recycling.’ We processed
these data to arrive at the total cost that was validated by the Air
Force. Table 2 shows all of the single bids. For example, offeror
OC1 bids $298,565 on installation IG1. OC1 also bids individually
on installations IL1, IR1, and IT1. On the other hand, installation
IA1 receives a single bid from each of the offerors OP1, OD1, OA1,
OS3, OK1, and OC3.
In order to demonstrate the strategic sourcing concept using
economies of scale for this study, we have used the single bids to
Table 2
Single bids in dollars.
IA1 IC1 IG1 IK1 IL1 IL2 IL3 IL4 IM1 IR1 IS1 IT1 IV1
OC1 298,565 1,309,276 582,403 495,784
OP1 723,485 237,556 286,125 917,634 1,425,608 156,354 592,445
OD1 650,125 215,445 245,369 925,618 1,350,874 175,894 408,996 278,996 585,226 579,445
OS1 921,658 225,789 424,608 292,115 817,779 601,298
OA1 627,569 952,325 375,000 262,395 587,497
OA2 398,565 268,975 592,668 492,961
OM1 932,548 364,860 882,285 592,235
OS2
OQ1 456,000




OI1 208,565 237,169 930,584 1,625,897 250,325 850,316 658,988 602,555
OG1 421,882 948,687 2,148,562 985,236
OK1 823,186 942,685 1,526,512 113,274 384,509 265,128 905,112 602,595 548,126
OC3 715,889 19,761
OC4 585,365
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create combined bids using following two rules:
1. Each offeror combines individual bids (to create multi-instal-
lation bids) up to a maximum number of installations per bid,
n. In our examples, we set n¼5. That is, if an offeror initially
has mZ5 individual bids, we will add new bids combining 2,
3, 4, and 5 of those bids, respectively, that is, a total of
(m/2)þ(m/3)þ(m/4)þ(m/5) bids. Of course, if the offeror has
mo5 individual bids, then we only generate (m/2)þyþ
(m/m) new combined bids.
2. All offerors offer the same percentage of quantity discounts,
which are based on the number of installations combined in
the bid. Specifically, we set the discount rate rk offered by any
offeror who is awarded k installations simultaneously to
2, 5, 8, and 10% for k¼2,3,4, and 5 installations, respectively.
We also assign numerical values to CPL for utilizing the
mathematical model solely for ease in developing the scenar-
ios. These are given in Table 3.
Based on the given category of confidence in performance
levels (such as Substantially Confident or Not Confident, for
instance) and on the numerical scale described in Table 3, each
offeror is assigned a numerical value for the CPL. These are listed
in Table 4. The smaller the value of CPL, the better the confidence
in the performance level.
In order to understand the effects of changes in the strategies,
we first evaluate total CPL (TCPL) and the corresponding cost
based on the current process of selection of the bids. Current
processes of selection (before applying the model) are based on
two distinct principles. The first process of selection (‘‘Selection 1:
Lowest Cost’’) chooses the least expensive single bid for an
installation with no regard to CPL. This process parallels the
procurement process with emphasis on lowest cost. The second
process of selection (‘‘Selection 2: Best CPL and Lowest Cost’’) first
chooses the offeror with the best CPL for that installation. If there
is a tie, then it is broken based on cost. Whoever offers the least
cost is selected. This selection process parallels the PPT approach.
It is clear that these selection processes may not be good
strategies. For example, if the lowest cost criterion were to be
used and one bid were just $1 higher than another, then it would
not be selected (even if the offeror were highly superior in CPL). In
our example (with 18 offerors and 13 installations given in
Table 2), the current selection process has 74 single bids for the
13 installations.
In order to implement the PO model, we generate additional
multiple-installation bids using the above-mentioned rules. For
18 offerors and 13 installations (with a maximum of five
installations in a combined bid), in addition to the given 74 single
bids, there are 1535 combined bids. It is important to note that
this number increases rapidly due to combined opportunities,
making the selection process computationally complex and jus-
tifying the use of our PO model.
As was described in the formulation of the model, the
objective function is to minimize cost in addition to incorporating
the importance of CPL. Strategies depend on the importance given
to TCPL and, of course, on the cost. Therefore, in order to vary the
importance of CPL, we use a weight, w, ranging from 102 to 108
(which is the coefficient of CPL in the objective function). This
allows us to favor selection based predominantly on cost, CPL, or
combination of these objectives (see Table 5), where lower the
weight means lower the preference for CPL. Among model-
scenarios, Model-Scenario-1 has objective function that favors
CPL the least whereas Model-Scenario-4 has objective function
that favors CPL the most.
5.2. Results and analysis
The results of the current selection processes are shown in
Table 6. The first selection process (similar to procurement
process with emphasis on lowest cost) yields TCPL of 27 for a
cost of $6,512,174, and the second selection process (similar to
PPT process) yields a TCPL of 15 for a cost of $7,261,312. These
results show that the least expensive strategic sourcing has a total
CPL of 27, which translates to about an average TCPL of 2 per
Table 3











1 2 3 4 5
Table 4
Numerical values of CPL for offerors.
Offeror CPL Offeror CPL Offeror CPL
OA1 2 OK1 2 OD1 1
OM2 3 OM1 3 OA2 3
OI1 3 OW1 1 OC3 3
OP1 1 OS1 3









Results from current selection process 1 and 2.
Installation Selection Process 1 Selection Process 2
Offeror CPL Cost ($) Offeror CPL Cost($)
IA1 OA1 2 627,569 OD1 1 650,125
IC1 OM2 3 199,064 OD1 1 215,445
IG1 OI1 3 237,169 OW1 1 241,635
IK1 OP1 1 917,634 OP1 1 917,634
IL1 OC1 1 1,309,276 OC1 1 1,309,276
IL2 OK1 2 113,274 OP1 1 156,354
IL3 OM1 3 364,860 OD1 1 408,996
IL4 OW1 1 250,976 OW1 1 250,976
IM1 OS1 3 817,779 OK1 2 905,112
IR1 OC1 1 582,403 OC1 1 582,403
IS1 OD1 1 579,445 OD1 1 579,445
IT1 OA2 3 492,961 OC1 1 495,784
IV1 OC3 3 19,761 OK1 2 548,126
Total 27 6,512,174 15 7,261,312
Table 7
Results of the model scenarios.
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installation (Satisfactory Confidence in the performance level of the
offerors). The second selection process which prioritizes the
offeror’s CPL and then the least expensive yields an average TCPL
of about 1.15 per installation (translating to slightly less than
Substantial Confidence in performance), but this occurs at an extra
cost of $749,138.
The results of the implementation of the PO model in Scenarios 1
through 4 (scenarios named for different values ofw) are described in
Table 7. The TCPL ranges from 26 to 14, with the corresponding cost
varying from $6,090,329 to $6,458,338.
For about the same average confidence in the performance
level (Satisfactory Confidence), the solution from the PO model
(Model-Scenario-1) is cheaper than the current process (Selection
1) solution by more than $500,000. On the other hand, for the best
average TCPL (Substantial Confidence) the solution from the PO
model (Model-Scenario-4) is less expensive than that from the
current process (Selection 2) by almost one million US$ in one
case, whereas more than one million US$ (Model-Scenario-3) in
the other. It should be noted that the highest cost solution from
the PO model is cheaper with better TCPL than the cheapest
solution from the current process. In addition, the most expensive
pricing strategy obtained from the PO model is cheaper than the
least expensive pricing strategy obtained from the current pro-
cess. Fig. 2 shows the comparison of these strategies.
6. Discussion and summary
Results of our implementation of the PO model suggest that such
an approach is a useful methodology for strategic sourcing. We
illustrate this approach in the context of the U.S. Air Force’s services
acquisition. The existing literature in strategic sourcing with quan-
titative methods has been predominantly product-oriented and
focused on different types of costs. In our research study we develop
an integer programming model, SCP, for choosing optimal mix of
service providers for the Air Force. This strategic sourcing approach
is particularly different since it is intended for service providers
instead of product suppliers. In addition, instead of focusing only on
the cost (Degraeve et al., 2000), we also leverage the confidence in
performance level similar to past performance (Talluri and
Narasimhan, 2004). Due to this flexibility, a manager can choose
any combination of these objectives based on the preference,
designated by a parameter for weight. Thus, unlike either solely
basing the objective on cost or solely using past preferences we
created a management lever for strategically sourcing the services in
the Air Force.
The PO model was developed for scenarios that were based on
choice of amount of preference given to CPL. The model chose the
bids based on importance given to TCPL and cost. This example
shows that the Air Force could realize important savings (with no
change in TCPL) by using the PO model. Similarly, this example
shows that by placing more importance on TCPL, the Air Force
will realize even higher savings.
We have discussed and verified that this approach was super-
ior to current practices in the Air Force in many respects. It is an
analytical approach that can be replicated and repeated for
various services acquisitions. In addition, the PO model uses
realistic data that are readily available to planners, and can be
modified to accommodate different preferences such as the
importance of cost relative to performance.
This methodology can also be applied to various regions in the
Air Force in addition to other DoD agencies, such as the Navy
(Dieges et al., 2009) and the Army. Moreover, the scope of the
model in this research is limited to a single type of service, but it
could easily be increased to multiple types of services. Another
natural extension of this research is to develop a similar model for
the strategic sourcing of supplies or specific commodities.
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